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More than forty years ago, in its landmark decision in Crane v. Commissioner,'
the Supreme Court announced the tax consequences of transferring property
subject to nonrecourse debt. 2 At the time Crane was decided, it was well settled
that the amount realized upon the transfer of property subject to recourse debt
included the debt.3 The transferor was relieved of a legal obligation, and it made
little difference whether the transferee paid the debt at the time of the transfer
or agreed to pay the debt in the future.4 One issue presented by Crane was
whether the consequences were the same when the taxpayer was not personally
liable for the payment of the debt.5
The Supreme Court agreed with the Commissioner that the amount realized
upon the sale or disposition of property subject to nonrecourse debt includes the
amount of the nonrecourse debt.6 The justification for the holding was that a
person who owns property subject to nonrecourse debt in an amount less than
the value of the property will treat the debt as a personal obligation despite the
absence of a legal duty to pay the debt.7 When the property is transferred subject
to the nonrecourse debt, the transferor realizes a benefit equal to the amount of
the debt.' The fact that the transferor is not personally liable for repayment of
the debt, or that the transferee does not assume payment of the debt, is imma-
terial.9 The reasoning adopted by the Court-that a person with equity in property
subject to nonrecourse debt will treat the debt as his own-prompted the Court
to add what Professor Bittker has since characterized as "the most famous
footnote in tax history": 10
*L. Scott Stafford (J.D., Harvard Law School) is Associate Dean for Academic Programs and
Associate Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
1331 U.S. 1 (1947).
21d. at 11.3See Id. at 13 n.34 (and cases cited therein).
41d. at 13.
51d. at 14.
61d. The taxpayer in Crane inherited an apartment building subject to a $262,000 unassumed
mortgage. id. at 3. She held the building for seven years during which time she claimed depreciation
deductions of $25,500 but made no payments on the mortgage. Id. at 2-3. She then sold the building
still subject to the mortgage for $3000, paid $500 for expenses, and reported a gain of $2500 on
the theory that the "property" sold was the equity, and the amount realized from the sale was limited
to the net cash received. Id. at 3-4. The Commissioner argued that the "property" sold was not the
equity, as the taxpayer claimed, but rather "the physical property itself . . . undiminished by the
mortgage." Id. at 4.7Id.
81d.
91d.
10Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REV. 277 (1978)
[hereinafter Bittker].
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[Footnote 37] Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of
the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit
equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered
where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mort-
gage without receiving boot. That is not this case. 
11
The issue raised in footnote 37 in Crane was extensively debated over the
next four decades. 2 It was not resolved until 1983 when the Supreme Court
decided Tufts v. Commissioner.'3
The taxpayers in Tufts were general partners in a partnership formed in 1970
for the purpose of constructing an apartment complex in Duncanville, Texas.' 4
Shortly after its formation, the partnership obtained a nonrecourse loan of
$1,851,500, which it used to finance construction of the complex.' 5 The part-
nership included the nonrecourse debt in its basis in the apartment complex and
thereafter claimed depreciation deductions on an unadjusted basis that included
the nonrecourse debt.' 6 The depreciation deductions were then passed through
to the individual partners in the partnership. 17 Due to unfavorable local economic
conditions the apartment complex never achieved full occupancy, and the cash
flow generated by rental of apartment units was never sufficient to enable the
partnership to make payments on the principal of the nonrecourse loan.'" By
August 28, 1972, the adjusted basis of the partnership in the apartment complex
(and the aggregate adjusted bases of the individual partners in the partnership)
was $1,455,470.19 On that date the partners conveyed the complex, as well as
their respective partnership interests, to a third party.2" As consideration, the
purchaser agreed to pay the expenses of sale up to $250, and to take the property
subject to the nonrecourse mortgage, which still totaled $1,851,500.21 The fair
market value of the complex at the time of the transfer was $1,400,000.22
The taxpayers contended that the amount realized from the disposition of the
"Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
"
2See, e.g., Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme
Court Opinion, 21 TAX. L. REv. 159 (1966); Bittker, supra note 10; Del Cotto, Basis and Amount
Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L.
REV. 69 (1969); Epstein, The Application of the Crane Doctrine to Limited Partnerships, 45 S. CAL.
L. REV. 100 (1972); Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719 (1975); Halpern, Footnote 37
and the Crane Case: The Problem That Never Really Was, 6 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 197 (1979);
McGuire, Negative Capital Accounts and the Failing Tax Shelter, 3 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 439 (1976);
McGuire, Tax Shelter Partnerships-Liabilities in Excess of Basis, 36 N.Y.U. INsT. 1443 (1978).






191d. at 302. In addition to the nonrecourse loan of $1,851,500, the partners contributed $44,212
in cash to the partnership. The aggregate bases of the partners in the partnership at the time of sale
equaled the nonrecourse loan ($1,851,500) plus the cash contributions ($44,212) less the depreciation
deductions and ordinary losses claimed by the partnership ($439,972). Id.
201d. at 303.211d.
221d.
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property was limited to its fair market value of $1,400,000, and thatthe trans-
action resulted in a loss of $55,740, the difference between the adjustedbasis
of the apartment complex and its fair market value. 23 The government argued
that the amount realized equaled the full amount of the $1,851,500 debt, and
that the sale resulted in a gain of $396,030.24 Thus, Tufts presented the issue
raised by footnote 37 in Crane: When property subject to nonrecourse debt in
excess of the value of the property is transferred, does the amount realized by
the transferor include the amount of the nonrecourse debt, or is the amount
realized by the transferor limited by the value of the property?
25
The Tufts casearoused extraordinary interest as it moved through the courts.26
The Tax Court held for the Commissioner and relied primarily upon the double
benefit that results if a taxpayer is permitted to claim depreciation deductions
based on the total nonrecourse debt but then, to exclude the total debt from the
amount realized when he disposes of the property. 27 The Fifth Circuit reversed
in a controversial decision that held that footnote 37 limited the amount realized
by the taxpayer to the fair market value of the complex. 28 The court of appeals
rejected the "double benefit" argument on the grounds that tax benefits-in the
form of depreciation deductions-are factored into the measurement of gain
through adjustments to basis, and that double taxation occurs if the same tax
benefits are used to expand the definition of amount realized.29
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and resolved the principal issue
in Tufts by holding that the treatment of nonrecourse debt upon the acquisition
and the disposition of property must be symmetrical.3" Because the entire amount
of the nonrecourse debt was included in the basis of the apartment complex at
the time of acquisition, and thereafter used to determine depreciation deductions,
the entire amount of the nonrecourse debt must be included in the amount realized
upon disposition of the complex. 31 According to the Court, the result in Crane
did not depend on the value of the property equaling or exceeding the amount
of the nonrecourse debt. 32 Instead, Crane "stands for the broader proposition
...that a nonrecourse loan should be treated as a true loan."
33
Numerous articles discussing Tufts appeared both before and after the Supreme
231d. at 303 n. 1. Each partner reported the sale of his partnership interest on his individual return
for the year 1972 and indicated that a loss had been suffered but that no loss was claimed. Tufts v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 761 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S.
300 (1983). In their Tax Court petition, the partners did claim deductions for the $55,700 loss.
Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303 n.1.24Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303 n.2. It is not clear whether the parties structured the transaction as a sale
of the complex by the partnership or as a sale of their partnership interests by the individual partners.
See infra note 54.25See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing footnote 37).26See infra note 34 (citing articles).
27Tufts, 70 T.C. 756, 769-70 (1978).28Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
291d. at 1061.30Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317.
3 11d.
321d. at 307.331d. at 313.
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Court's decision.34 Most of this discussion has focused on the principal issue
raised by the case-i.e., the treatment of nonrecourse debt when the value of
property is less than the amount of the debt. This emphasis is understandable,
because the principal holding applies broadly to all types of taxpayers who
transfer property subject to debt in excess of the property's fair market value.
There has been a tendency, however, both before and after the Tufts decision,
to neglect a second, narrower question presented by the case.
35
II. THE OTHER ISSUE IN TUFTS
Also at issue in Tufts was the interpretation of section 752,36 which applies
only to partnership transactions:
SEC. 752. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN LIABILITIES
(a) INCREASE IN PARTNER'S LIABILITIES.-Any increase in a partner's share
of the liabilities of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities
by reason of the assumption by such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be
considered as a contribution of money by such partner to the partnership.
(b) DECREASE IN PARTNER'S LIABILITIES.-Any decrease in a partner's share
of the liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's individual
34See, e.g., Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949 (1983) [hereinafter Andrews]; Friedland,
Tufts and Millar: Two New Views of the Crane Case and its Famous Footnote, 57 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 510 (1982); Halliday and Manno, Death of a Footnote: A Current View of Crane and the
Road to Tufts, 36 S.C.L. REv. 403 (1985); Hemming, Footnote 37 of Crane Reviewed, I B.U.J.
TAX L. 65 (1983); Lurie, New Ghosts for Old--Crane Footnote 37 Is Dead (Or Is It?), 2 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 89, 20 TAX NoTEs 3 (1983) [hereinafter Lurie]; Narisco, Some Reflections on Commis-
sioner v. Tufts: Mrs. Crane Shops at Kirby Lumber, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 929 (1983) [hereinafter
Narisco]; Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37, Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Newman]; McGuire, On the Treatment of Realization of Gain on Re-
capturing Prior Deductions-Some Thoughts on Millar, Tufts, and Footnote 37, 6 J. REAL EST.
TAX'N 132 (1979); Sexton and Charyk, Liabilities in Excess of Fair Market Value: The Uncertain
Scope of the Tufts Case, 6 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 251 (1979); Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amounts
Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 OR. L. REV. 3 (1980); Simmons, Tufts v. Com-
missioner: Amount Realized Limited to Fair Market Value, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 577 (1982);
Smith, Crane's Footnote 37 Laid to Rest, 49 Mo. L. REV. 372 (1984); Zimmerman, Crane and
Tufts: Resolved and Unresolved Issues, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 631 (1985) [hereinafter Zimmerman];
Note, The Continuing Controversy over Crane's Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 1982 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 753; Comment, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1498 (1982); Note, The Amount Realized upon Disposition of Property Secured by a Nonrecourse
Mortgage is Limited By the Fair Market Value of Such Property--Tufts v. Commissioner, 31 EMORY
L.J. 242 (1982); Comment, Tufts-The Resurrection of Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV
575 (1981); Comment, Federal Income Taxation-Determination of the Amount Realized on Dis-
position of Property Subject to a Nonrecourse Mortgage, 11 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 611 (1981);
Comment, Crane's Footnote Thirty-Seven Gets the Boot, I I SETON HALL L. REV. 679 (1981); Note,
Income Tax: Gain Computation-Footnote Thirty-Seven Exception of Crane Applied to Limit the
Inclusion of Nonresource Debt in Amount Realized to the Fair Market Value of the Disposed
Depreciable Real Estate-Tufts v. Commissioner, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 162 (1982); Note, Jackson Rean-
alyzed: Preventing Tax Free Escape Upon Transfer of a Partnership Interest, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 317 (1984).35See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (identifying the "other issue" in. Tufts).36See Tufts, 416 U.S. at 314-17 (discussing section 752). Lurie, supra note 34, discusses section
752(c) in some detail. Other articles that address section 752(c) include Andrews, supra note 34;
Narisco, supra note 34; and Zimmerman, supra note 34.
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liabilities, shall be considered as a distribution of money to the partner by the
partnership.
(c) LIABILITY TO WHICH PROPERTY IS SUBJECT.-For purpose of this section,
a liability to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market
value of such property, be considered as a liability of the owner of such property.
(d) SALE OR EXCHANGE OF AN INTEREST.-In the case of a sale or exchange
of an interest in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as
liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated with
partnerships.
37
The taxpayer in Tufts argued that Congress codified footnote 37 when it enacted
section 752(c). 38 Consequently, regardless of the treatment.of other taxpayers
who dispose of property subject to excess nonrecourse debt, the amount of
nonrecourse debt taken into account in partnership transactions is limited by the
value of the property securing the payment of the debt.
39
The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of section 752(c).'° According
to the Court, Congress intended that the fair market value limitation of section
752(c) apply only to contributions of encumbered property by a partner to a
partnership and distributions of encumbered property by a partnership to a part-
ner.41 Other types of partnership transactions, including the sale of an interest
in a partnership holding encumbered property, were subject to the same rules
as sales of property generally.4 2 The Court in Tufts explained the necessity for
a narrow application of section 752(c) as follows:
By placing a fair market value limitation on liabilities connected with property
contributions to and distributions from partnerships under subsections (a) and
(b), Congress apparently intended § 752(c) to prevent a partner from inflating
the basis of his partnership interest. Otherwise, a partner with no additional
capital at risk in the partnership could raise the § 704(d) limit on his distributive
share of partnership losses or could reduce his taxable gain upon disposition of
his partnership interest. See Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v.
Commissioner, 18 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 16 n. 116 (1982). There is no potential
for similar abuse in the context of § 752(d) sales of partnership interests to
unrelated third parties. In light of the above, we interpret subsection (c) to apply
only to § 752(a) and (b) transactions, and not to limit the amount realized in a
sale or exchange of a partnership interest under § 752(d).43
371.R.C. § 752.38Tufts, 461 U.S. at 314.391d.
401d. at 317.4 11d.
42See id.431d. at 316-17. The Tax Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the scope of section 752(c).
Tufts, 70 T.C. 756, 769 (1978). The Fifth Circuit expressed some doubt regarding the Tax Court's
restrictive construction of the "unambiguous language" of section 752(c), but did not address the
section 752(c) issue because its holding that the fair market value limitation applied to all sales of
property subject to excess liabilities avoided any conflict between section 752(c) and section 752(d).
Tufts, 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8.
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III. EFFECT OF PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES ON OUTSIDE BASIS
To evaluate fully the Court's interpretation of section 752(c), it is necessary
to understand the effect of partnership liabilities on the individual members of
a partnership. Generally, partnership liabilities are allocated among the individual'
partners.' A limited partner's share of partnership liabilities, however, cannot
exceed the difference between the amount he has already contributed to the
partnership and the amount he is obligated to contribute under the limited part-
nership agreement. 45 When none of the partners (including the general partner
of a limited partnership) is personally liable for the payment of a partnership
liability, the liability is allocated among all partners, including limited partners,
in accordance with the ratio for sharing profits under the partnership agreemeni
46
Section 752(a) treats an increase in a partner's share of partnership liabilities as
equivalent to "a contribution of money" to the partnership by the partner. 47 The
partner is allowed to increase his adjusted basis in his partnership interest (com-
monly referred to as his "outside basis") to reflect his constructive contribution
of cash to the partnership. 48 An increase in his outside basis has'important
collateral consequences for the individual partner: (1) it increases the amount of
partnership losses that can be passed through to him, 49 and (2) it increases the
"See Regs. § 1.752-1(e) (partnership liabilities are allocated among the individual partners).
Generally, partners share partnership liabilities in accordance with the ratio for sharing losses under




481.R.C. § 705(a), 722.
491.R.C. § 704(d). Under section 704(d), a partner's distributive share of partnership losses can
be deducted only to the extent of his adjusted basis in the partnership. Section 704(d) is but one of
several impediments to the partner who seeks to deduct losses attributable to his share of partnership
nonrecourse debt. Section 465 prevents a partner from deducting losses from an activity in excess
of the amount for which the partner is "at risk." A partner is not considered at risk with respect
to nonrecourse loans to the partnership. I.R.C. § 465(b)(1). Because sections 704(d) and 465 operate
independently, a partner who has sufficient outside basis to claim losses under section 704(d) may
be barred from claiming the losses by section 465. The restrictions of section 465 are somewhat
ameliorated by section 465(b)(6)(A), which provides that a taxpayer is considered at risk with respect
to his share of "qualified nonrecourse financing" secured by real property used in the activity.
Qualified nonrecourse financing is defined as financing which is borrowed from a qualified person
(a lender who is not related to the taxpayer, who is not the seller of the real property held in the
activity, and who does not receive a fee with respect to the taxpayer's investment in the real property
held in the activity), which is not convertible debt, and with respect to which no person is personally
liable for repayment. I.R.C. 465 (b)(6)(B). Section 465 was not a problem for the taxpayers in Tufts
because the at risk rules did not apply to the holding of real property during the tax years in question.
See Technical Corrections Act of 1979, § 102(a)(I)(D)(ii), Pub. L. No. 96-222, 94 Stat. 194 (1980)
(repealing real property exclusion). Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 extends the at risk rules
to the holding of real property, the exception for "qualified nonrecourse financing" means that
many taxpayers investing in real estate partnerships will continue to escape section 465's restrictions
on logs deductions.
The passive loss rules set out in section 469 may also limit a partner's ability to deduct his share
of partnership losses whether or not the losses are attributable to nonrecourse debt. I.R.C. § 469.
In general, the section prevents an individual, trust, estate, or personal service corporation from
using losses from passive activities (defined as an activity that involves the conduct of a trade or
business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate) to offset salary, dividends, interest,
portfolio gains, or income from active business activities. See I.R.C. § 469(a), (c), (e). There is a
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amount of cash that can be distributed to him tax free. 50
On the other hand, section 752(b) treats a decrease in a partner's share of
partnership liabilities as a distribution of cash by the partnership to the partner.
5
'
This constructive distribution of cash reduces the partner's outside basis52 and
thereby reduces the amount of future partnership losses that can be passed through
to the partner and the amount of cash that can be distributed to him tax free.
Moreover, if the amount of the constructive cash distribution exceeds his outside
basis, the partner realizes income to the extent of the excess.
5 3
The Court in Tufts may not have fully considered the interaction between the
fair maiket value limitation of section 752(c) and the liability rules of section
752(a) and (b). The sale of a partnership interest, such as occurred in Tufts, 54
is only one of several partnership transactions that may involve the transfer of
property subject to nonrecourse debt in excess of the property's fair market
value. The potential problems generated by the Court's explanation of the scope
of section 752(c) can be illustrated by examining four other partnership trans-
actions: (1) the contribution to a partnership of property subject to debt nonre-
course debt in excess of the property's fair market value, (2) the distribution by
a partnership of property subject to nonrecourse debt in excess of the property's
fair market value, (3) the sale by a partnership of property subject to nonrecourse
debt in excess of the property's fair market value, and (4) the purchase by a
special $25,000 exemption from the passive loss rules available to a taxpayer who owns 10% or
more of a rental real estate activity and who actively participates in the activity. See I.R.C. § 469(i).
• Finally, the partner who seeks to deduct his share of partnership losses must also .contend with
section 704(b) and Regulations section 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv), which establish an elaborate set of tests
to determine whether the allocation of partnership losses and deductions among partners has sub-
stantial economic effect. Failure to satisfy the tests may result in a reallocation of losses and
deductions. Regs. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv).
Unless otherwise stated, this article assumes that sections 465, 469, and 704(b) and (d) are not
applicable.
3°See I.R.C. § 733(l) (cash distributions to a partner reduce his adjusted basis in the partnership).
Gain is not recognized in the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner, except to the extent
that money distributed exceeds his adjusted basis. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1).
5
'.R.C. § 752(b).
52See I.R.C. § 733 (calculating basis of distributee partner's interest).
531.R.C. § 731(a)(1).
5'The Supreme Court's opinion is confusing on this point. It is not clear whether Tufts is a case
in which the partners sold their interests in the partnership or a case in which the partnership sold
all of its assets and then liquidated. The Court initially states that "[e]ach partner . . . sold his
partnership interest to an unrelated third party." Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303. See also supra note 15 and
accompanying text (suggesting Court viewed transaction as a sale of partnership interest). If the
transaction was a sale of a partnership interest, then the individual partners would recognize gain
equal to the difference between their adjusted basis in the partnership and the amount realized from
the sale (i.e., the amount of debt from which the partners were relieved as a result of the transfer).
See I.R.C. §§ 752(d) and 1001(a). There is language, however, in the first footnote in the Tufts
opinion that suggests that the Court was treating the case as one in which there was a partnership
loss of $55,740 from the transfer of the apartment complex, which was then passed through to the
individual partners. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303 n. 1. In all probability, the Court viewed the transaction
as the sale by the partners of their partnership interests. This article proceeds on that assumption.
The consequences of treating Tufts as the sale of the complex by the partnership are discussed later.
See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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partnership of property subject to nonrecourse debt in excess of the property's
fair market value.
A. Contribution to Partnership of Property Subject to Excess Debt
According to Tufts, section 752(c) prevents a partner from inflating his basis
in the partnership by contributing to the partnership property subject to liabilities
in excess of the fair market value of the property. 55 Unfortunately, the opinion
does not explain why this is so.
When a partner contributes property subject to liabilities to a partnership, the
liabilities are shifted to the partnership, 56 but a portion of the new partnership
liabilities are then allocated back to the contributing partner in accordance with
the partnership arrangement for sharing liabilities. 57 The contributing partner
makes the following three simultaneous adjustments to the basis of his partnership
interest: (1) he increases his basis by an amount equal to the adjusted basis of
the contributed property; 58 (2) he reduces his basis to reflect the constructive,
distribution of cash that occurs when the liabilities on the property are shifted
to the partnership;5 9 and (3) he increases his basis to reflect the constructive
contribution of cash that occurs when a portion of the new partnership liabilities
are allocated to him.' In effect, a partner who contributes encumbered property
to a partnership increases his basis in the partnership by an amount equal to the
adjusted basis of the contributed property less any liabilities shifted to other
partners. 6' The other members of the, partnership adjust their respective bases
in the partnership to reflect the new partnership liabilities allocated to them. 62
Applying the fair market value limitation of section 752(c) to a contribution
of property subject to liabilities in excess of the property's fair market value
limits the extent to which liabilities of the contributing partner are shifted to the
partnership. This, in turn, affects the allocation of the liabilities among the
partners and, consequently, their respective outside bases in the partnership.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's statement in Tufts, application of the fair market
value limitation of section 752(c) to contributions of property subject to excess
debt does not prevent the contributing partner from inflating the basis of his
partnership interest.
To isolate the effect of a contribution of encumbered property, assume that
an individual owns the apartment complex at issue in Tufts and that he contributes
the apartment complex to an existing two-member partnership, in which he owns
a 50% partnership interest. In addition, assume that his adjusted basis in the
complex is $1,455,000, the fair market value of the complex is $1,400,000, and
the nonrecourse liability on the complex totals $1,851,000.
55Tufts, 461 U.S. at 316.
56See Regs. 1.752-1(c).
5"See Regs. 1.752-1(e).
58I.R.C. §§ 705(a), 722.591.R.C. §§ 752(b), 733.
6 0I.R.C. §§ 752(a), 722.61For examples, see Regulations section 1,752-1(b)(2) and (c).621.R.C. §§ 752(a), 722.
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If the fair market value limitation of section 752(c) is not applied to the
transaction, the partnership is treated as assuming the entire $1,851,000 liability,
which is then allocated equally between the two partners. The tax consequences
of the transaction to the partnership, the contributing partner, and the other
partner are as follows:
(1) The partnership's basis in the complex is $1,455,000-the contributing
partner's basis in the property.
63
(2) The basis of the contributing partner in the partnership is increased by
$529,500-the adjusted basis of the contributed property ($1,455,000) reduced
by the liability transferred to the partnership ($1,851,000) and increased by the
share of the partnership liability allocated to him ($925,500).64
(3) The basis of the other partner is increased by $925,500, the one-half share
of the partnership liability allocated to him.
65
If the fair market value limitation of section 752(c) applies to the transaction,
the partnership assumes the liability only to the extent of the $1,400,000 fair
market value. One-half of the new partnership liability of $1,400,000 is allocated
to the contributing partner and the other half is allocated to the other partner.
The tax consequences of the transaction to the partnership, the contributing
partner, and the other partner are as follows:
(1) The partnership's basis in the complex is still $1,455,000, the adjusted
basis of the property in the hands of the contributing partner.66
(2) The contributing partner's basis in the partnership is increased by $755,000-,
the adjusted basis of the coniributed property ($1,455,000) reduced by the lia-
bility transferred to the partnership ($1,400,000) and increased by the one-half
share of the partnership liability allocated to him ($700,000).67
(3) The other partner's basis in the partnership is increased by $700,000-
the one-half share of the partnership.liability allocated to him.
68
This example illustrates that the application of the fair market value limitation
to contributions of encumbered property to a partnership does not prevent the
contributing partner from inflating the basis of his partnership interest. Instead,
by limiting the extent to which his individual liabilities are shifted to the part-
nership and thence to the noncontributing partner, it allows the contributing
partner to inflate his basis in the partnership at the expense of the noncontributing
partner. The aggregate basis of both partners is $1,455,000, whether or not the
section 752(c) fair market value limitation is applied. Its application merely
increases the basis of the contributing partner. 69
631.R.C. § 723.64I.R.C. §§ 722, 752(b).
65l.R.C. §§ 705, 752(a).
66I.R.C. § 723.671.R.C. §§ 722, 752(b).
68I.R.C. §§ 705, 752(a).69See I A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 44.03 (3d ed. 1988)
(illustrating how section 752(c) increases the contributing partner's basis) [hereinafter WILLIS]. An
alternative interpretation of the Court's statement in Tufts is that the fair market value limitation of
section 752(c) is designed to prevent the noncontributing partner from inflating his basis. As dem-
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Moreover, application of the fair market limitation to the liabilities does not
prevent the partnership from taking an inflated basis in the contributed property:
Whether or not section 752(c) is applied, the partnership's basis in the complex
is $1,455,000-the adjusted basis of the complex in the hands of the contributing
partner.70 The partnership will be able to claim depreciation on a value that
exceeds the current fair market value of the complex.
The Commissioner might argue that a nonrecourse liability should be totally
ignored when it exceeds the fair market value of contributed property since it
cannot be assumed that the partnership will discharge any of the liability. As
discussed below, the Service has enjoyed some success with this argument in
cases involving the purchase of property subject to excess debt by a partnership. 7'
In these cases, however, the Service's argument was based on the speculative
nature of the liability rather than a literal application of section 752(c). Once
the Service concedes that section 752(c) applies to a contribution of encumbered
property to a partnership, it becomes difficult to ighore the plain language of
the Code. If Congress intended that the assumption of liabilities should be totally
disregarded and not simply limited when the liabilities exceed the fair market
value of contributed property, it could have made that intent clear. The only
reasonable construction of the phrase "to the extent of the fair market value of
such property" 72 is that the partnership assumes liabilities in an amount equal
to the fair market value of the contributed property.
Applying a fair market value limitation to contributions of property subject
to excess debt also raises collateral problems that' are not addressed in Tufts.
Among these problems is the treatment of that portion of the liability in excess
of the fair market value of the property. In the above hypothetical the partnership
is treated as assuming only $1,400,000 of the $1,851,000 debt. The excess debt
of $451,000 presumably remains the liability of the contributing partner. What
happens if the partnership makes principal payments on the liability?
The two leading authorities on partnership taxation, McKee7 3 and Willis, 7 4
disagree on the answer. McKee proposes the following solution:
[A] portion of the subsequent principal payments should probably be treated as
partial "assumptions" by the partnership of additional portions of the liability
from the contributor, thereby triggering additional constructive distributions to
him under § 752(b), additional constructive contributions by the other partners
under § 752(a), and finally constructive distributions to all partners under § 752(b).
The net effect should be a wash as to the other partners, and a net distribution
to the contributor in the amount of the additional assumption. 75
onstrated, it clearly does this. The noncontributing partner increases his outside basis by only
$700,000 if the fair market value limitation is applied, versus $925,000 if the limitation is not
applied.70I.R.C. § 723.7 1See infra notes 123-138 and accompanying text.
72I.R.C. § 752(c).73W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
(1977) [hereinafter MCKEE].
74WILLIS, supra note 69.75McKEE, supra note 73, at 7.04(1).
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Willis, the other principal partnership tax reference work, proposes a different
approach:
[Consistency with the apparent rationale of § 752(c) would suggest the appli-
cation of mortgage payments to the recognized portion of the liability first with
the 'attendant tax consequences under § 752(b) for the satisfaction of a portion
of the partnership liability. Once the recognized portion of the liability is ex-
hausted, then the additional payments probably should be deemed to constitute
a § 752(b) payment in order to maintain a balance between the partners' outside
bases and the partnership's inside basis. The conceptual difficulty arises because
§ 752(b) adjustments seemingly are dependent upon, a prior recognition and
inclusion of the amount under § 752(a). 76
It seems more logical to apply principal payments first to that portion of the
liability that is not assumed by the partnership. Until the excess liability is
discharged the partnership has no real equity in the property. McKee's approach
is, however, unduly complex insofar as it treats the payments by the partnership
on the unassumed debt as a shift of additional liabilities to the partnership, which
are then discharged. In effect, the. partnership makes a payment on liabilities
owed by an individual partner. Normal accounting procedures treat the payment
as a distribution of cash by the partnership to the partner, which is then used by
the partner to pay his personal obligation. This approach produces the same end
result as McKee's approach without ever shifting the unassumed liabilities to
the .partnership.
The treatment of the excess debt is also a problem if the partnership subse-
quently disposes of the property at a time when the debt still exceeds the fair
market value of the property. In the example above, assume that the partnership
is unable to make payments on the nonrecourse debt and conveys the. apartment
complex to a third party for nominal consideration at a time when its fair market
value is still $1,400,000 and the amount of the liability is still $1,851,000. If
section 752(c) applied to the original contribution of property, then the partner-
ship assumed only $1,400,000 of the liability and realizes only $1,400,000 in
debt relief upon a subsequent disposition of the property." On the other hand,
76WLuIs, supra note 69, at § 44.04.
1.R.C. § 752(c). Tufts is based on the need for symmetry in the treatment of liabilities when
acquiring and disposing of property. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 313. It would seem to follow from this
rationale that the amount realized upon the disposition of property subject to excess debt cannot
exceed the debt originally assumed by the taxpayer. The Supreme Court suggested the following
result in footnote 6 of the Tufts opinion: "In this case, respondents received the face value of their
note as loan proceeds. If respondents initially had given their note at a discount, the amount realized
on the sale of the securing property might be limited to the funds actually received." Id. at 309
n.6. In addition, the regulations state that a liability is not included in amount realized "to the extent
such liability was not taken into account in determining the transferor's basis for such property."
Regs. § 1.1001-2(a)(3).
In 1984 Congress added section 7701(g) to the Code, which states:
CLARIFICATION OF FAIR MARKET VALUE IN THE CASE OF NONRECOURSE INDEBTEDNESS.-
For purposes of subtitle A, in determining the amount of gain or loss (or deemed gain or
loss) with respect to any property, the fair market value of such property shall be treated
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the partnership's basis in the property is the carryover basis of $1,455,000, 71
less any depreciation claimed by the partnership after the contribution of the
complex to the partnership. Since the partnership carryover basis of $1,455,000
includes the $1,855,000 debt to which the property is subject, the manner in
which gain or loss is calculated violates the Tufts requirement that the same
amount of nonrecourse debt be considered in determining adjusted basis and
amount realized.7 9'
The problem is more complicated if the property increases in value between
the time of its contribution to the partnership and its disposition by the partner-
ship. There are at least two solutions. One approach is to disregard the fair
market value of the property, and in accordance with the "symmetry" require-
ment, limit the amount realized by the partnership upon disposition of the property
to the amount of debt originally assumed by the partnership. A second approach
is to treat subsequent increases in the value of the property as triggering additional
shifts in debt from the contributing partner to the partnership. These shifts in
liabilities would, in turn, result in constructive distributions of cash to the con-
tributing partner and constructive contributions of cash by the other partners. At
least one writer has suggested that changes in the value of partnership property
subject to excess debt trigger shifts in liabilities, and that annual appraisals are
necessary to comply with the letter of the law. 8" The Tax Court also raised this
possibility in its opinion in Tufts. 8 Other commentators, however, have rejected
the approach on the grounds of administrative convenience since it would require
constant adjustments to reflect fluctuations in the value of property subject to
as being not less than the amount of any nonrecourse indebtedness to which such property
is subject.
I.R.C. § 7701(g). This section may require the inclusion of all nonrecourse indebtedness in amount
realized upon disposition of property regardless of the amount of debt included in basis when the
property was acquired. See Pennell, An Analysis of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions Affecting
Partnerships: Part 11, 61 J. TAX'N 378, 383 (1984).
Section 7701(g) may also alter the operation of section 752(c) if it means that the fair market
value of encumbered property is deemed to be equal to debt in a transaction subject to section 752(c).
The legislative history of section 7701(g), however, indicates that it does not apply to transactions
covered by section 752(c). See MCKEE, supra note 73, at 7.04 (Cum. Supp. No. 1 1988) (citing
report by the Joint Committee on Taxation).7SI.R.C. § 723.
79Once the partnership disposes of the encumbered property, it is no longer tenable to argue that
the excess debt ($451,000) is still a liability of the contributing partner. Therefore, upon recognition
of the gain (or loss) by the partnership, the contributing partner should be required to reduce his
basis in the partnership by $451,000 to reflect his release from liabilities in that amount.
Another possibility is that the contributing partner must recognize cancellation of indebtedness
income in an amount equal to the excess debt when the partnership disposes of the encumbered
property. The propriety of this approach is questionable given the traditional view that a taxpayer
does not recognize cancellation of indebtedness income when relieved of a nonrecourse liability.
See Collins v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1471 (1963); Hotel Astoria, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 42 B.T.A. 759, 764 (1940); Fulton Gold Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 519, 521
(1934). The Supreme Court declined to adopt a cancellation of indebtedness solution to the Tufts
problem. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317, 319 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
S°Seago & Horvitz, Some Subtle Effects of the Partnership Constructive Distribution Rules, 58
TAXES 97, 101 (1980).
"
1Tufts, 70 T.C. at 769 n. 12.
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excess debt. 2 As a general rule, a taxpayer does not recognize gain or loss to
reflect variations in the value of property until the gain or loss is "realized"
through disposition of the property. For the same reason, any recognition of a
change in partnership liabilities or a partner's share of partnership liabilities to
reflect fluctuations in the value of collateral should be deferred until the part-
nership disposes of the property.
B. Distribution by a Partnership of Property Subject to Excess Debt
In Tufts the Supreme Court also singled out distributions of property subject
to excess debt for application of the fair market value limitation of section
752(c).83 As in the case of contributions of such property to a partnership, the
Court does not explain how application of the fair market limitation reduces a
partner's ability to inflate his basis in the partnership. But, unlike its application
to contributions of 'property, application of section 752(c) to distributions of
property does limit the ability of the distributee partner to increase his outside
basis. The partner who receives a distribution of encumbered property from a
partnership reduces his basis in the partnership by an amount equal to the adjusted
basis of the distributed property in the hands of the partnership 4 and increases
his basis in the partnership to the extent the distribution shifts liabilities from
other partners to him. 85 By limiting the amount of liabilities shifted from the
other partners to the distributee partner, the fair market value.limitation of section
752(c) results in a lower basis for the distributee partner.
To illustrate, assume that a partnership with two equal partners owns an
apartment complex which has an adjusted basis of $1,455,000, a fair market
value of $1,400,000, and is subject to nonrecourse debt of $1,851,000. If the
apartment complex is distributed to one of the partners in a nonliquidating
distribution, the distributee partner takes an adjusted basis in the distributed
property equal to the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the part-
nership.8 6 The distributee partner is also deemed to make a constructive contri-
bution of cash to the partnership under section 752(a) to the extent his post-
transfer share of liabilities on the property exceeds his pretransfer share of
liabilities.87 The other partner is treated as receiving a constructive distribution
of cash to the extent his share of partnership liabilities is reduced by the distri-
bution of the encumbered property.88 Without the application of the section
8
"McKEE, supra note 73, at 7.04 n.42; Aronsohn, The Financially Troubled Partnership, 34th
Ann. N.Y.U. INST. 327, 350-51 n.56 (1976).83Tufts, 461 U.S. at 31.
41.R.C. § 733(2).85 1.R.C. §§ 752(a), 722.
16 1.R.C. § 732(a)(1). This assumes that the distributee partner has sufficient outside basis prior
to the distribution to absorb the adjusted basis of the property. The results are different if the
distribution is a liquidating distribution or if the distributee partner's basis in the partnership is less
than the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the partnership. See I.R.C. § 732(a)(2), (b);
see also infra note 96.
8 71.R.C. § 752(a).
88 1.R.C. § 752(b).
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752(c) fair market value limitation, the amount of debt shifted to the distributee-
partner increases and the distributee partner ends up with a higher basis in the
partnership at the expense of the other partner. The net effects of the distribution
to the partners are as follows:
(1) The distributee partner's basis in the distributed property is $1,455,000-
the partnership's basis in the property immediately before the distribution.
89
(2) The distributee partner's basis in the partnership is reduced by $529,500.
(His basis prior to the distribution is reduced by the $1,455,000 adjusted basis
of the distributed property and increased by the constructive cash contribution
of $925,500 that occurs when his share of liabilities increases from $925,500
to $1,851,000.) 90
(3) The other partner's basis in the partnership is reduced by $925,500 (There
is a constructive distribution of cash when his one-half share of the partnership
liability of $1,851,000 is shifted to the distributee partner). 91
. If the fair market value limitation of section 752(c) applies to the distribution,
the net effects of the distribution to the partners are as follows:
(1) The distributee partner still takes an adjusted basis in the distributed prop-
erty of $1,455,000.92
(2) The distributee partner's basis in the partnership is reduced by $980,500.
(His basis prior to the distribution is reduced by the $1,455,000 adjusted basis
of the distributed property and increased by the constructive cash contribution
of $474,500 that occurs when his share of liabilities increases from $925,500
to $1,400,000.) 93
(3) The other partner's basis in the partnership is reduced by $700,000. (There
is a constructive distribution of cash when his one-half share of the partnership
liability of $1,400,000 is shifted to the distributee partner.) 94
By reducing the amount of liabilities shifted to the distributee partner, appli-
cation of the fair market value rule to the distribution of property subject to
excess debt increases the amount by which the distributee partner's basis in the
partnership is reduced. To that extent, the fair market value rule does prevent a
distributee partner from inflating his basis in the partnership. At the same time,
however, the application of section 752(c) limits the gain that the nondistributee
partner would normally recognize on being relieved of his one-half share of the
$1,851,500 debt. 95
By focusing on the possibility that a partner may inflate his basis in the
partnership, however, the Court may have again overlooked a greater threat to
891.R.C. § 732(a)(1).
90I,R.C. §§ 733(2), 752(b), 722.
911.R.C. §§ 752(b), 731(l).921.R.C. § 732(a)(1).931.R.C. §§ 733(2), 752(a), 722.
941.R.C. §§ 752(b), 733(l).95See WILLIS, supra note 69, at § 44.04 (providing a more detailed illustration).
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tax revenues. Application of the fair, market value limitation has no effect on
the adjusted basis of the distributed property in the hands of the distributee
partner. As long as his basis in the partnership before the distribution (as adjusted
for any shifts in liability, resulting from the distribution) is sufficient to absorb
the adjusted basis of the distributed property, the distributee partner takes a
carryover basis in the distributed property. 96 This carryover basis typically re-
flects the full amount of the original nonrecourse liabilities on. the property
97'
The distributee partner may be willing to trade a lower basis in.the partnership,
which-may have-no immediate tax consequences for the distributee partner, 98
for higher current depreciation deductions with respect to the distributed property.
Application of the fair market value limitation of section 752(c) to distributions
of property subject to excess liabilities may prevent inflation of the distributee
partner's basis in the partnership, but it does not prevent the 'possible inflation
of the adjusted basis of the distributed property.
By limiting the extent to which partnership debt is shifted to the distributee
partner, section 752(c) -raises the question of how to treat the debt that is not
shifted to the distributee partner. McKee proposes treatment similar to that
adopted with respect to contributions. of property subject to excess debt. 99 The
liability on the partnership property is fragmented. The disiributee partner as-.
sumes the liability only to the extent of the fair market value of the distributed'
property, and the excess is treated as a continuing liability of the partnership.'o
Subsequent principal payments by the distributee partner are considered addi-
tional constructive contributions under section 752(a) by the distibutee partner,
followed by additional constructive distributions under section 752(b) to all
partners. '0 ' The net effect on the distributee partner is a wash, but other partners
will reduce their bases to the extent their respective shares of the liabilities are
reduced. Willis would presumably follow an approach consistent with his treat-.
96I.R.C. § 732(a). If his adjusted basis in the partnership'is not sufficient to absorb the adjusted
basis of the distributed property, a partner who receives a nonliquidating distribution takes an adjusted
basis in the distributed property equal to his adjusted basis in the partnership. I.R.C. § 732(a)(2)..
If the distributee partner's interest in the partnership is completely liquidated as a result of the
distribution, then his basis in the distributed property is equal-to his adjusted basis in his partnership
interest. I.R.C. § 732(b). With respect to both a liquidating and a nonliquidating distribution, a
distributee partner's outside basis is adjusted for the deemed distribution that occurs as a result of
his assumption of the liabilities associated with the property. Because it limits the assumption of
liabilities by the distributee partner, section 752(c) can reduce the basis of the-distributed property
in the hands of the distributee partner.
97In the illustration above, the distributee partner takes an adjusted basis in the apartment complex
of $1,455,000, which reflects the original nonrecourse debt of $1,851,000, less the depreciation
claimed with respect to the complex by the partnership. Compare the illustration in Andrews, supra
note 34, at 958 n.52.
9 The reduction will generate gain if it exceeds the distributee partner's basis in the partnership.
I.R.C. § 731(a)(1). Otherwise, the impact will come in future years when the lower outside basis
reduces the partnership losses passed through to the distributee partner (I.R.C. § 704), reduces the
amount of tax free distributions to the distributee partner (I.R.C. § 731(a)(1)), and increases the
gain (or loss) when the distributee partner-disposes of his partnership interest.
99McKEE, supra note 73, at 7.04(l).
1I0d.
10 11d.
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ment of excess debt in the contribution context, i.e., subsequent mortgage pay-
ments would be applied first to the distributee partner's portion of the debt.t 02
C. Sale by a Partnership of Property Subject to Excess Debt
In Tufts, the partnership transferred property subject to excess debt.' 013 The
partnership was required to recognize gain equal to the difference between its
basis in the property and the amount of the nonrecourse debt regardless of the
fair market value of the property."o The'gain was then passed through to the
individual partners.
. The transfer by a partnership of property subjectto excess debt by a partnership
is complicated by the constructive distribution rules of section 752(b). Normally,
when a partnership conveys property subject to debt, the resulting gain is passed
through to the partners and increases their bases, in the partnership. 05 But the
conveyance also reduces each partner's share of partnership liabilities, and the
constructive distribution of cash to each partner that occurs under section 752(b)
reduces his basis in the partnership. 106
The Court's discussion in Tufts of the scope of section 752(c)107 may cause
problems with respect to this section 752(b) adjustment. It is not clear from that
discussion whether the fair market value limitation of section 752(c) applies only
to contributions and distributions of property subject to excess debt, or whether
it applies to all property transactions in which a partner makes constructive
contributions to a partnership pursuant to section 752(a) or receives constructive
distributions from a partnership pursuant to section 752(b). The first sentence
in the Court's statement implies that section 752(c) applies only to property
contributions and distributions subject to section 752(a) or (b).' 08 The legislative
history cited by the Court lends some support to this interpretation. ' 0 9 On the
'
02See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
103Tufts, 461 U.S. at 302.
1041d. at317.
1051.R.C. §§ 702(a), 705(a)(l)(A).
I-1.R.C. § 733(1).
17 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 316-17.
'
8See id. at 316.
'
09The House and Senate reports in connection with § 752(c) state the following:
Frequently, a partner will assume partnership liabilities or a partnership will assume a
partner's liabilities. In some cases this occurs as a result of a contribution of encumbered
property by the partner to the partnership or as a result of a distribution of such property
by the partnership to the partner. The provisions of this section prescribe the treatment
for such transferred liabilities. Whenever a partner's individual liabilities are increased
because of the assumption by him of partnership liabilities, the amount of the increase
shall be treated as a contribution of money by the partner to the partnership. Similarly,
when the liabilities of the partnership are increased, thereby increasing each partner's share
of such liabilities, the amount of the increase shall be treated as a pro rata contribution
by the partners, thereby raising the basis of each partner's interest in the amount of his
share of the increase.
Conversely, when a partner's personal liabilities are decreased because a portion of them
have been assumed by the partnership the amount of the decrease shall be treated as a
distribution of money by the partnership to the partner. Similarly, when the liabilities of
the partnership are decreased, thereby decreasing each partner's share of such liabilities,
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other hand, the final sentence can be read as applying section 752(c) to all
transactions involving section 752(a) or (b). '1 0 If this latter construction is correct,
then it may be possible to circumvent the holding of Tufts by having the part-
nership transfer property subject to excess debt and. then liquidate."'
To illustrate, assume that two equal partners form the partnership at issue in.
Tufts, claim the depreciation on the apartment complex, and then arrange for
the partnership to convey the complex to a third party at a time when the fair
market value of the complex is $1,400,000, the debt on the property is still
$1,851,000, the adjusted basis of the complex is $1,455,000, and the basis of
each partner in the partnership is $727,500. Applying Tufts to the sale of the
property, the partnership realizes $396,000 in gain, which is split equally between
the two partners. If section 752(c) limits the section 752(b) constructive distri-
bution of cash to the fair market value of the property sold, then the basis of
each partner in the partnership following the sale is $225,500-the outside basis
before the sale ($727,500)-increased by his distributive share of partnership
taxable income ($198,000), and reduced by the constructive distribution of one-
half the liabilities on the property ($700,000). 2 Upon liquidation, each partner
is entitled to a capital loss deduction of $225,500 (his basis in the partnership)." '
In summary, rather than claim a $55,000 ordinary loss at the partnership level-
and then divide that loss equally between the two partners, the partnership should
recognize a $396,000 capital gain, split the gain equally between the partners
($198,000 each), and then liquidate so that each partner can recognize an off-
setting $225,500 capital loss. The end result is the same as that sought by the
partners in Tufts-a net loss of $27,500 each.'1 4
the amount of the decrease shall be treated as a pro rata distribution by the partnership,
thereby reducing the basis of each partner's interest in the amount of his share of the
decrease.The transfer of property subject to a liability by a partner to a partnership, or by
the partnership to a partner, shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such property,
be considered a transfer of the amount of the liability along with the property.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A236; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405
(1954) (emphasis added).
The committee reports begin by discussing contributions and distributions of encumbered property
as a "type of case" in which a partner will assume partnership liabilities or a partnership will assume
a partner's liabilities. In the paragraph explaining the fair market value limitation of section 752(c),
the reports seem to be addressing the same "type of case." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. A236; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1954).
The government argued in Stackhouse v. United States, 441 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g
71-1 USTC 9128, 27 AFTR 2d 414 (W.D. Tex. 1970), that section 752(b) applied only to
transactions in which a distribution to a partner occurs. The court, however, rejected the argument
and held that section 752(b) applied to any transaction in which a partner's share of liabilities or
share of partnership liabilities is reduced. See Stackhouse, 441 F.2d at 468-69.
"
0Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317
"'See also Andrews, supra note 34, at 958 n.51 (making similar point).
121.R.C. §§ 705(a), 752(b), 733(1).
131.R.C. § 731(2).
141n Tufts, the taxpayers contended that the partnership suffered a long term capital' loss of
$55,740 which should be passed through to the partners. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303. In the hypothetical
discussed in the text, the loss suffered by the partners on liquidation of the partnership would likewise
be capital in character. I.R.C. §§ 732(a)(2), 741.
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It is unlikely that the Tufts Court intended, to apply the fair market value rule
of section 752(c) to all section 752(a) and (b) transactions. A careful reading of
the opinion suggests that the Court was concerned with transfers of encumbered
property and not with other situations in which section 752(a) or (b) comes into
play. Although the Supreme Court opinion statesithat the individual partners
sold their partnership interests to a third party,"l5 the Tax Court opinion indicates
that, in addition, the partnership conveyed the apartment complex to the third
person. 1 16 Given the importance of Tufts, the-holding was probably not grounded
on the fact that the parties structured the transfer of the apartment complex as
a sale of partnership interests rather than a sale of the apartment complex by the
partnership. Such emphasis on form over substance can be avoided if the scope
of section 752(c) is limited to actual contributions of property to and distributions
of property by a partnership. The section should not be applied to limit the relief
from liabilities that occurs when a partnership conveys property subject to excess
debt. In the problem described above, the outside basis of each partner should
be reduced by a constructive distribution of $925,500, rather than $700,000,
resulting in an outside basis of zero and no gain or loss recognized upon the
subsequent liquidation of the partnership. The tax consequences to the two
partners would, therefore, be the same whether they conveyed their partnership.
interests or the partnership conveyed the apartment.complex and then liquidated.
D. Purchase by a Partnership of Properly Subject to Excess Debt
As discussed above, application of the fair market value limitation of section
752(c) only partially addresses the Supreme Court's concern that a partner might
use property subject to excess debt to inflate his basis in a partnership. The limit
does result in a lower outside basis in the case of distributions of property subject
to excess debt, but it may inflate basis in the case of contributions of such
property. One explanation for the Court's language is that the Court confused
the operation of the fair market value limitation in the context of contributions
of encumbered property to and distributions of encumbered property from a
partnership, with the operation of the limitation in the context of purchases of
encumbered property by a partnership. This explanation is supported by the
reference in the opinion to footnote 116 in the Newman article cited therein. 117
In footnote 116, Newman discusses the Tax Court's conclusion in Tufts that
subsection (c) "was directed solely at the narrow possibility . . . that property
may be transferred in the partnership context with the transferee attempting to
claim an inflated basis equal to the full nonrecourse mortgage despite a lesser
fair market value." 118
When property subject to excess debt is acquired by a partnership from a
nonpartner, application of the fair market value limitation prevents basis inflation.
'15Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303.
M6Tufts, 70 T.C. at 761. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's characterization of the transaction).
l"7Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317
"
8Newman, supra note 34, at 17.
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Assume that a two person equal partnership acquires property worth $1,400,000
but which is subject to debt of $1,855,000. If the partnership is treated as
assuming the, entire $1,855,000 in. debt, then each partner will increase his
partnership basis by $927,500 to reflect the section 752(a) constructive contri-
bution of cash to the partnership. 9 If the fair market value limitation of section
752(c) applies, then the constructive cash contribution (and basis increase) by
each partner is only $700,000.120
-Although the acquisition by a partnership of property subject to excess debt
is probably a frequent occurrence, there is surprisingly little authority for the
effect of section 752(c) on such transactions. In Revenue Ruling 80-42,121 a.
limited partnership acquired motion picture exhibition rights worth $400X by
paying $500X cash and delivering a nonrecourse promissory note for $1,500X
secured by the film rights and one. half the net receipts earned by the film. The
Service ruled that the. basis of the partnership in the film rights was limited to
the $400X fair market value. The ruling did not discuss the effect on the bases
of the partners in the partnership nor did it cite section 752(c).
In other cases involving the acquisition by a partnership of property subject
to excess debt, the Service has not been as generous as indicated by the language
of Revenue Ruling 80-42. Rather than concede the partnership an adjusted basis
in the property equal to its fair market value, the Service has often argued that
the total liability, and not just the portion that exceeds the value of the property,
should be disregarded in determining the basis of the property in the hands of
the partnership. 122
In Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 123 a joint venture engaged in drilling
for oil and gaspurchased five mineral leases and a drilling contract pursuant to
which the sellers of the leases agreed to drill a test well on each lease.124 The
partnership delivered nonrecourse notes totaling $660,000 for the leases and
drilling contracts, secured only by the leases, which had a fair market value of
$63,500.125 The District Court held that no portion of the $660,000 nonrecourse
note could be included in the outside bases of the individual partners. 12 6 The
court relied primarily on the Crane rationale that an owner of property subject
to nonrecourse debt will treat the debt as his own only when he has equity in
the property. 127 Section 752(c) was mentioned only as reinforcing the court's
conclusion that a taxpayer will not treat a nonrecourse debt as his own when the
value of the collateral is less than the debt. 128 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
District Court's conclusion but affirmed on other grounds. 1
29
1191.R.C. § 752(a).
1201.R.C. § 752(a), (c).
1211980 C.B. 182-83.
122See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58.
123637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981), affg 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
'
241d. at 1043.
"Gibson Products, 460 F. Supp. at 1112.1261d. at 1115.
'
271d. at 1117.1281d.
129Gibson Products, 637 F.2d at 1052.
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A similar result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner.'30 There, a limited partnership purchased a motel in exchange
for$75,000 in prepaid interest and a $1,224,000 nonrecourse note payable over
a ten-year period with a balloon payment due at the end of ten years.' 3' The
partnership then leased the motel back to the sellers at a monthly rental that
equaled the debt service on the nonrecourse note. 13 2 At issue were the depre-
ciation and interest deductions claimed by the partnership.' 33 The Tax Court
treated the entire transaction as an option arrangement pursuant to which the
partnership paid $75,000 for the right to purchase the motel at any time during
the next ten years.' 34 It therefore denied the depreciation and interest deduc-
tions. '3 In affirming, the Ninth Circuit rejected the option analogy and held
instead that the failure of the partnership to demonstrate that the purchase price
was at least approximately equal to the fair market value of the motel was fatal
to the claims for depreciation and interest deductions. 136
The Service was quick to adopt the holding of Estate of Franklin in its battles
with tax shelter partnerships that use nonrecourse debt to purchase property at
inflated prices. Revenue Ruling 77-110117 considered the purchase by a limited
partnership of the right to exhibit a completed motion picture in exchange for
$200X and a nonrecourse note in the amount of $1,800X secured only by the
film rights and one-half of the net receipts earned by the film. The ruling
concluded that in the absence of evidence that the fair market value of the film
at least approximated the amount of the nonrecourse obligation, the amount of
the note was not includible in the basis of the film rights acquired by the
partnership.' 38
In contrast, the Tax Court in Brountas v. Commissioner,139 which was decided
while Tufts was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, reached a different conclusion.
In Brountas, a limited partnership engaged in drilling for oil and gas issued a
nonrecourse note as partial payment for a mineral leasehold interest and the
seller's promise to drill on the leased property.' 40 The note was secured by
revenues from future oil and gas production, the value of which was uncertain
but probably less than the face amount of the note."' Although the Service
argued that no portion of the liability should be treated as a liability of the
partnership due to the speculative value of the collateral, the Tax Court held that
the face amount of the note was a liability of the partnership includible in the
130544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976), affg 64 T.C. 752 (1975).
131id. at 1046.
1321d. at 1047.









13973 T.C. 491, 571 (1979), vacated, 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982), affd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. 693 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983).
'Brountas, 692 F.2d at 154.
1411d.
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bases of the individual partners. 14 2 The court apparently felt constrained to reach
this result by its earlier decision in Tufts. 43 Adoption of the Service position
might mean that a partner who sold his interest in the partnership would not be
allowed to include the debt in his basis, but would be required under Tufts to
include the debt in the amount realized from the sale. This fear was probably
unfounded in view of the Supreme Court's conclusion in Tufts that symmetrical
treatment of debt is required.'" A partner who is not permitted to include debt
in his basis in the partnership should not be required to include the debt in the
amount realized upon disposition of his partnership interest. 145
The foregoing rulings and cases indicate the following three possible results
when a partnership acquires property subject to excess debt: (1) the debt assumed
by the partnership is not limited by the fair market value of the property; 146 (2)
the debt assumed by the partnership is limited to the fair market value of the
property; 147 or (3) the debt is so speculative that no portion is assumed by the
partnership.1 48 None of the rulings or cases offers much guidance on the appli-
cation of section 752(c) to a partnership's acquisition of property subject to
excess debt.
The Tax Court mentioned section 752(c) in Brountas, but it concluded, con-
sistent with its earlier holding in Tufts, that the section applies only to contri-
butions of encumbered property by a partner to a partnership and distributions
of encumbered property by a partnership to a partner. 149 The court's refusal to
apply section 752(c) to limit the constructive contribution of cash by the partners
to the partnership that occurs when the partnership acquires the encumbered
property suggests that section 752(c) does not apply in the absence of an actual
contribution or distribution of property by the partnership.
Revenue Ruling 80-42 does not cite section 752(c) as support for the prop-
osition that a partnership which acquires property subject to excess debt assumes
the debt only to the extent of the property's fair market value. This may mean
that the Service was announcing a rule applicable to taxpayers in general, and
not just partnerships. It also lends support to the argument that section 752(c)
applies only to actual contributions of property to or distributions of property
from a partnership.
The rulings and cases holding that no portion of a speculative debt is assumed
by a partnership likewise offer little guidance on the scope of section 752(c). If
no portion of the debt is assumed by the partnership, it never becomes necessary
'
4 2Brountas, 73 T.C. at 574-75.
'
431d. at 575.
'"See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309 n.6. See also Regs. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) (precluding inclusion of debt
not originally included in basis in amount realized).
145But see supra note 77 (discussing section 7701(g)).
'"See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text (discussing Brountas).
'47See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text (discussing Rev. Rul. 80-42).
'"See supra notes 123-138 and accompanying text (discussing Gibson Products, Estate of Frank-
lin, and Rev. Rul. 77-110).
149Brountas, 73 T.C. at 573.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 42, No. I
SECTION OF TAXATION
to determine whether section 752(c) limits the section 752(a) constructive con-
tribution of cash by individual partners.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 752(c).
The conclusions reached thus far regarding the application of the fair market
value limitation of section 752(c) to various partnership transactions can be
summarized as follows:
(1) The fair market value limitation does not prevent a partner from inflating
his partnership basis by contributing to the partnership property subject to excess
liabilities. Application of the fair market value limitation to this transaction
merely affects the post contribution split of liabilities between the existing part-
ners and the contributing partner. Moreover, it does not prevent the partnership
from receiving an inflated basis in contributed property.
(2) The fair market value limitation does affect the extent to which a partner's
outside basis increases when the partnership distributes to the partner property
subject to excess liabilities. Again, application of the fair market value limitation
merely affects the split of the liabilities between the partnership and the partner.
(3) The fair market value limitation does not limit the constructive distribution
of cash (i.e., the debt from which a partnership is relieved) that occurs when a
partnership transfers property subject to excess liabilities.
(4) The application of the fair market value limitation to partnership acqui-
sitions of property subject to excess debt is uncertain.
Many of the problems discussed in connection with the first two transactions
result from the Court's use in Tufts of the terms "contribution" and "distri-
bution" to describe the transactions to which the fair market value limitation
applies. The Court relied on the legislative history of section 752(c) in reaching
its conclusion that the section applied to "contributions" and "distributions"
of property.1 50
The Court's interpretation of the legislative history may be unsubstantiated.
The sentence in the congressional reports cited by the Court in Tufts reads as
follows: "The transfer of property subject to a liability by a partnership, or by
the partnership to a partner, shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such
property, be considered a. transfer of the amount of the liability along with the
property."' 5' A transfer of property to a partnership by a partner is not necessarily
a contribution of the property, and a transfer of property by a partnership to a
partner is not necessarily a distribution of the property. Section 707(a) recognizes
that a partner can deal with a partnership other than in his capacity as a partner. 152
A transfer of property from a partner to a partnership is usually treated as a
contribution of the property to the partnership, but it can also be structured as
a sale of property to the partnership. The fact that a partner has no equity in
150See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 315-16 (Court also cited Regulations section 1.752-1(c)).
'
5 ITufts, 461 U.S. at 315 n.15 (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A236;
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1954)).
152See I.R.C. § 707(a) (some transactions considered as "occurring between the partnership and
one who is not a partner").
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property at the time it is transferred to a partnership argues against "contribution"
characterization because the partner has nothing to contribute to the partnership.
Instead, the partner-acting other than in his capacity as partner-has sold the
property to the partnership. Pursuant to section 752(c) the partnership assumes
the debt on the property only to the extent of the property's fair market value. 53
Consequently, the partnership takes a cost -basis in the property equal to its fair
market value, not a carryover basis equal to the adjusted basis of the property
in the hands of the individual partner. The partners are allocated additional
liabilities, and therefore increase their respective bases in the partnership, in an
amount not exceeding the fair market value of the purchased property.
The sale rather than contribution characterization also controls the tax con-
sequences to the transferor partner. If the individual partner has "sold" and not
"contributed" the property to the partnership, then section 721, which provides
that a partner does not recognize gain upon contribution of property to a part-
nership, is inapplicable. Instead, the disposition of the property by the partner
is controlled by the primary holding of Tufts. The individual partner has trans-
ferred property subject to excess debt. Since the entire amount of the nonrecourse
debt was included in the determination of his adjusted basis in the property, he
is deemed to realize the entire amount of the debt when he transfers the property
to another.
To illustrate, assume the facts set forth in the hypothetical in connection with
'5 The ability of the Service to recharacterize a "contribution" of property to a partnership as a
"sale" was strengthened in 1984 with the enactment of section 707(a)(2)(a).. This provision permits
the Service to treat a transfer to a partnership as a sale rather than a contribution if:
(i) there is a direct or indirect transfer of ... property by a partner to a partnership,
(ii) there is a related direct or indirect transfer of money by the partnership to such
partner . . . and
(iii) the transfers described in clauses (i) and (ii) ...are properly characterized as a
sale or exchange of the property.
I.R.C.'§ 707(a)(2)(B). The constructive distribution of money that occurs under section 752(b) when
a partner transfers property subject to excess'debt meets the requirement for a "direct or indirect"
transfer of money by the partnership to the partner, and the fact that the partner has no equity in
the transferred property provides a basis for characterizing the transfer as a sale.
At least one argument against treating debt relief as a transfer of money within the meaning of
section 707(a)(2)(B)(ii) is the legislative history of the provision. The Senate Finance, Committee
report states:
[Tllie committee does not intend to change the general rules concerning the tax treatment
of the partners under sections 721, 731, andi 752 to the extent (i) contributed property is
encumbered by liabilities not incurred in anticipation of the contribution, or (2) contributions
to a partnership which, because of liabilities of the partnership incurred other than in
anticipation of the contribution result in a deemed distribution under sec. 752(b).
EXPLANATION OF THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., DEFICIT REDUCTION
ACT OF 1984 (Comm. Print 1984). But the committee was probably concerned that the Service might
attempt to treat every transfer of encumbered property as a candidate for recharacterization under
section 707(a)(2)(B). The comm ittee language should not foreclose application of section 707(a)(2)(B)
to a transaction, such as that described in the text, where the amount of the nonrecourse debt exceeds
the fair market value of the property.
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the contribution of encumbered property.1 54 The results to the partnership, the
contributing partner, and the other partner are as follows:
(1) The partnership's basis in the complex is $1,400,000, the liabilities to
which the property is subject but only to the extent of the fair market value of
the property. 155
(2) The contributing partner recognizes a gain of $396,000, the liabilities to
which the property is subject ($1,851,000) less his adjusted basis in the property
($1,455,000).
(3) The contributing partner and the other partner each increases his basis in
the partnership by $700,000, the amount by which his share of partnership
liabilities increases as a result of the transfer to the partnership.
Treating the transfer as a section 707(a) sale rather than a section 721 con-
tribution of property solves another problem posed above-the posttransfer treat-
ment of the debt in excess of the property's fair market value. There is nothing
in Tufts suggesting that the amount realized by a transferor who transfers property
subject to excess debt must equal the amount of nonrecourse debt included in
the basis of the transferee.' 56 If the transferor partner is treated as relieved of
more debt than is assumed by the transferee partnership, it is no longer necessary
to split the post transfer face amount of the debt between the partner and the
partnership. Partnership payments on the debt after the transfer would result in
the assumption of additional liabilities by the partnership but not the relief of
additional partner liabilities.Section 707(a) should also apply to the distribution by a partnership to a
partner of property subject to excess debt. The transfer should be treated as a
sale to the partner other than in his capacity as a partner. The general rule of
Tufts should apply so that the partnership realizes the amount of the debt, with
any resulting gain or loss flowed through to the individual partners, including
the transferee partner. Section 752(c) applies to the transferee partner, and he
takes a basis in the distributed property that includes the debt only to the extent
of the property's fair market value. ' 5
7
For example, assume that a partnership with two equal partners distributes to
one of the partners an apartment complex with a basis of $1,455,000 and a fair
market value of $1,400,000 which is subject to debt of $1,851,000. If the transfer
is treated as a section 707(a) sale of the Complex to the partner, the results are
as follows:
(1) The distributee partner takes a basis in the complex equal'to $1,400,000
because the liabilities are included in his basis only to the extent of the property's
fair market value.
'
54See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
'"5Cf. Rev. Rul. 80-42, supra note 121.
156For example, given the holdings in Gibson Products, 637 F.2d at 1052, and Estate of Franklin,
544 F.2d at 1048, it is unlikely that the person who purchased the apartment building in Tufts would
get a basis equal to the full amount of the $1,851,500 in liabilities.
" Compare rulings and cases discussed supra notes 121-145.
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(2) The partnership 'recognized a gain of $396,000-its amount realized of
$1,851,000 less its adjusted basis of $1,455,000.
(3) The $396,000 partnership gain is split equally between the two partners.
(Each partner increases his basis in the partnership by $198,000, but each partner
also reduces his outside basis by $925,500 to reflect the partnership's relief from
liabilities of $1,851,000.) 158
Treating a transfer of property subject to excess debt as a sale rather than as
a contribution to or distribution by a partnership would be inappropriate if the
face amount of the debt did not reflect the true amount of the debt. because the
interest rate on the debt was below the current market rate of interest. 15 9 In such
a case, a contribution or distribution of "equity" in property can occur, even
though the face amount of the debt on the property exceeds the property's fair
market value..
To illustrate, assume that the $1,851,000 debt at issue in Tufts carried an
interest rate of 8% per year and was repayable in thirty installments of $164,420.
If interest rates increased 12% per year, the value of the debt would drop to
$1,324,433. Under these circumstances, the owner of the property still has
"equity" in the property even though the value of the property dropped to
$1,400,000. If the owner transferred the property to a partnership, the transfer
should be treated as a contribution and not a sale of the property, and section
752(c) should apply to cap the amount of debt assumed by the partnership.
V. THE PURCHASE OF AN INTEREST IN A PARTNERSHIP THAT
OWNS PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EXCESS DEBT
One troublesome "loose end" is the application of section 752(c) to a very
common partnership transaction that has not yet been discussed-the purchase
of an interest in a partnership that owns property subject to excess debt. While
the Supreme Court did not address the effect of section 752(c) on such a trans-
action, the Tax Court was careful to state in its opinion that it was not passing
"upon whether nonrecourse liabilities in excess of the fair market value of the
property securing such liabilities are included in the basis of a partnership interest
acquired by purchase." 16o
Generally, a person who purchases an interest in a partnership takes an adjusted
basis in the partnership equal to the amount paid for the interest plus the amount
of partnership liabilities assumed by him. 161 If section 752(c) applies only to
'
58For the reasons discussed in supra text accompanying note 116, the constructive case distribution
that occurs when the property is transferred should not be limited by the fair market value of the
property.
'
59Cf. WILLIS, supra note 69, at 44.03. In the last few years Congress has enacted a number
of provisions that recognize that the face amount of the debt may need to be adjusted to reflect
differences between the interest rate on the debt and the current market rate of interest. See generally
I.R.C. §§ 1271-1278.
16°Tufts, 70 T.C. at 770 n.13.16 1Section 742 states that the basis of a partnership interest acquired other than by contribution
shall be determined under section 1011 and following. To the cost basis provided by section 1012,
the acquiring partner adds the amount of liabilities allocated to him under section 752(a).
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actual, contributions or distributions of encumbered property, then it does not
limit the extent to which the purchasing partner increases his outside basis to
take into account the newly acquired partnership liabilities.
Relying once again on the figures used above, assume that a partner acquires
a 10% interest in a partnership whose assets include property with an adjusted
basis of $1,455,000 and a value of $1,400,000 but which is subject to a liability
in the amount of $1,851,000. The acquiring partner's adjusted basis in the
partnership will include his share of partnership liabilities.' 62 Is his share of
liabilities one-tenth of $1,851,000, or one-tenth of $1,400,000? If section 752(c)
applies only to actual contributions of property to a partnership, then his share
of partnership liabilities is not affected by the fair market value of the property,
and he includes $185,100 in his outside basis. If the scope of section 752(c)
extends to all constructive contributions of cash under section 752(a), then his
share of partnership liabilities is limited to the fair market value of the property,
and his outside basis is increased by only $140,000.
There are apparently no reported cases that deal specifically with the acqui-
sition of an interest in a partnership at a time when the partnership owns property
subject to liabilities in excess of the fair market value of the property. McKee,
one of the few commentators to address the problem, concludes that the fair
market value limitation should be applied in this situation, but suggests that the
acquiring partner is entitled to adjust his partnership basis in the event of sub-
sequent principal payments by the partnership. 163
Applying section 752(c) to purchases of a partnership interest is troublesome
in at least one respect. In the discussion above, application of section 752(c) to
the constructive distribution of cash that occurs when a partnership sells property
subject to excess debt was rejected because it would enable partners to circumvent
the principal holding of Tufts. 16' It is difficult to justify applying section 752(c)
to the constructive contribution of cash that occurs when a partner acquires an
interest in a partnership that owns property subject to excess debt but not applying
section 752(c) to the constructive distribution of cash that occurs when a part-
nership sells property subject to excess debt. 165 Such a rule could have anomalous
results for the acquiring partner. In the hypothetical described above, the ac-
quiring partner will increase his outside basis by $140,000 upon acquisition of
his partnership interest, but absent some special rule not found in the statute,
he will reduce his outside basis by $185,100 if the partnership sells the encum-
bered property or if he sells his partnership interest. 1
66
It should also be noted that the application of section 752(c) to limit the debt
1
621.R.C. §§ 752(a), 722.
163 McKEE, supra note 73, at 7.04(2).
'64See supra note I l I and accompanying text.
165One possible basis for distinguishing the two transactions is that the latter involves the transfer
of the encumbered property, and that the general rule of Tufts overrides section 752(c) in such a,
case.
1661.R.C. §§ 752(b), 733. This assumes that the principal balance of the debt is not reduced in
the interim.
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assumed by an acquiring partner will not, at least initially, affect the depreciation
deductions passed through to the acquiring partner. The amount paid by the
acquiring partner does not change the adjusted basis of property in the hands of
the partnership. 6 7 Whether the acquiring partner is treated as assuming $185,100
or only $140,000 in liabilities, the partnership will continue to claim depreciation
deductions based on the partnership's original adjusted basis in the property and
will pass one half of those depreciation deductions through to the acquiring
partner. Because it affects his outside basis, the amount of debt assumed by the
acquiring partner will limit the partnership losses that can be passed through to
the acquiring partner, but a substantial period of time may pass before the section
704(d) limit is applicable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In resolving the issue raised in footnote 37 in Crane v. Commission, Tufts v.
Commissioner announced an important principle of tax law-the amount realized
from the disposition of property includes the liabilities to which the property is
subject regardless of the fair market value of the property. But the Court's
treatment of the second issue in Tufts-the scope of section 752(c)-was less
thoughtful. Its cavalier statement that the fair market value limitation applies
only to "contributions" to and "distributions" of property from a partnership
will require clarification in the future. There is no need to apply the fair market
value limitation of section 752(c) to contributions and distributions because the
term "contribution" implies that the contributor has some equity in the property
to'contribute and the term "distribution" implies that the distributor has some
equity to distribute. It is only when the fair market value of property is less than
the liabilities to which the property is subject that section 752(c) limits the amount
of liabilities assumed by the transferee (but not the amount of liabilities from
which the transferor is relieved). Thus, a preferable interpretation of section
752(c) is that the fair market value rule applies to "transfers" of property by a
partner to a partnership or "transfers" by a partnership to a partner. This recasting
of the scope of section 752(c) has several beneficial consequences. First, it limits
the basis of a transferee (whether partnership or partner) of property subject to
excess liabilities to the fair market value of the transferred property. Second, it
1671.R.C. § 743(a). Section 754 allows the partnership to file an election to adjust the basis of.
partnership assets to reflect the price paid by an acquiring partner for his pro rata share of partnership
assets. If the acquiring partner pays more than his pro rata share of the partnership's basis in
partnership assets, then the partnership increases its basis in the assets to reflect the price paid. See
I.R.C. §§ 754, 755. Similarly, a purchase price which is less than the acquiring partner's pro rata
share of the partnership's basis in partnership assets can result in a downward adjustment in the
basis of partnership assets.
If a section 754 election is in effect with respect to the partnership acquisition described in the
text and the fair market limitation of section 752(c) is not applied, then the partnership will adjust
its basis in the property upward by $39,600, one half of the total liabilities ($185,100) less one
tenth of the partnership's basis in the property ($145,500). If section 752(c) is applied to limit the
liabilities assumed by the acquiring partner, then the partnership's basis in the property must be
adjusted downward by $5500, one half of the partnership's basis in the property ($145,500) less
the liabilities assumed by the acquiring partner ($140,000).
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requires the transferor (whether partnership or partner) of such property to realize
an amount equal to the face amount of the liabilities. Finally, it avoids splitting
the liabilities between the transferor and transferee.
This approach is consistent with the principal holding of Tufts because it
requires the transferor to include nonrecourse debt in the amount realized to the
extent the debt was originally included in the transferor's adjusted basis. It is
also compatible with decisions holding that a purchaser of property subject to
debt in excess of the property's fair market value cannot include the excess debt
in the adjusted basis of the property. 168
16'See Rev. Rul. 80-42, supra note 121. Cf. Gibson Products, 637 F.2d at 1052; Estate of Franklin,
544 F.2d at 1048; Rev. Rul. 77-110, supra note 137.
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